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 Th e Place of Rhetoric in Late Republican 
Law: Some Th oughts on  Pietas and the 
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 Th e general understanding of modern scholarship on Roman law concludes that 
the discipline is based on scientifi c principle. 1 Th is perspective informs not only 
our understanding of how Roman law operated among the ancients, but also 
modern interaction with the subject, not least in its application to contempo-
rary domestic laws. 2 Among Romanists, there has been enthusiasm for asserting 
scientifi c principle as the fundamental basis of the discipline. Th is is derived 
from an adherence to two connected historical narratives created in nineteenth-
century Germany and adopted with vigour by subsequent scholars. 3 Th e fi rst 
narrative is that of continuity. It asserts that law has undergone a progressive 
process since the decline of the Roman Empire in the West, by which it has 
moved in stages toward a recapturing of the scientifi c accomplishments of the 
Romans. 4 Th e second narrative is that of science. It asserts that, during the later 
Republic period, under the guidance of professionalised jurists such as Quin-
tus Mucius Scaevola  pontifex , and aft er a singular injection of Greek categorical 
thought, Roman law became an autonomous, scientifi c system, free from extra-
legal considerations, such as the social and the economic. 5 Th e achievement of 
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science is the  summum bonum and end-point of the teleological trajectory of 
legal continuity. 
 It is my intention to cast some doubt on this foundational myth of a scientifi c 
revolution in Roman law in the late Republic, and, by extension, on the narra-
tives of continuity and science that rely upon its supposition. 6 In order to do so, 
I will examine the extent to which legal change in the later Republic, the period 
of the theoretical inception of legal science, was decisively reliant upon extra-
legal considerations. In particular, I intend to argue that rhetoric was used in 
order to assert the existence of the socially understood normative value of  pietas 
in the relationship between testators and potential heirs, and that a rhetorical 
proof of such a relationship was the postulate, or  locus , upon which a change in 
the law was based. 
 To this end, the fi rst point I will examine is the development and operation 
of the  querela inoffi  ciosi testamenti . Th e second point I raise will examine how 
 pietas , as a socially understood concept within Roman culture, informed decision-
making in succession disputes. Th is will require a twofold examination of the 
social understanding of the concept of  pietas in the later Republic, alongside a 
study of its direct application in law. 
 I. Th e Development and Operation of the  Querela 
Inoffi  ciosi Testamenti 
 Th e  querela inoffi  ciosi testamenti came into use in the mid-fi rst century  bce , a later 
addition to Roman succession law than the praetorian innovation  bonorum posses-
sio . Th e  querela provided protection to expectant heirs against a testator who, for 
reasons beholden unto himself, had disinherited them through a will. Reasons 
for disinheriting expectant heirs are several and varied, some more rational than 
others. Roman law had been satisfi ed as a matter of general principle to aff ord to a 
testator the broad discretion to disinherit almost whomsoever he pleased: prodigal 
sons, wayward daughters, and inattentive spouses could all eff ectively be disin-
herited by testament. Some restrictions existed  – not least the formal requirement 
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in law to adhere to valid testamentary form. 7  Bonorum possessio came to form a 
post-death restriction upon the realisation of the will of the testator but, as the 
operation of a claim was necessarily  post mortem , its relationship to the writing of 
a testament takes on a diff erent hue from measures designed to off er protection 
to expectant heirs during a testator ’ s lifetime. Some protection for expectant heirs 
was provided through  praeteritio . 8 Th is rule set out that a testator had a duty by 
which he ought either expressly to institute as heirs those to whom in intestacy 
the property would pass, or, conversely, ought expressly to disinherit them. If no 
mention of such people was made in the will, they took on the title of  praeteriti and 
the whole will could be undermined and property passed on under the civil law 
rules of intestacy. 9 Th e protection aff orded by  praeteritio , as Leage cogently argues, 
is the lingering trace of the ancient idea that property was vested in the family and 
not the individual  paterfamilias . 10 Th is view is rooted in the idea that  sui heredes 
were regarded in their father ’ s lifetime as something approaching family property, 
socially if not legally. Th e result was that, for instance, in the  ius civile , a son in 
 potestas could be disinherited either by being named in the testament as disin-
herited or by an expression making it clear by identifi cation that the intention of 
the testator is to disinherit him. Failure to do so could result in the will becom-
ing void on challenge and falling into intestacy.  Praeteritio therefore off ered some 
protection to the family of the testator, insofar as the disinheritance of  sui heredes 
must be explicitly expressed and formally enshrined in order to be free from chal-
lenge.  Praeteritio , though providing some solace to a child fearful of the intentions 
of a disgruntled parent, was far from a perfect protection of his expected birth 
right. A testator with the determination to disinherit his disaff ected kin need only, 
perhaps with some legal advice, construct a formally valid testament which identi-
fi ed those potential  praeteriti whom he wished to divest. Th e ancient  ius civile , in 
this respect, very much favoured the testator over the dispossessed potential heir, 
and allowed for disinheritance as long as it was explicitly expressed. 
 Th e  querela developed as an attempted perfection of the protection aff orded 
by  praeteritio . It exceeded its antecedent in the protection it aff orded to expectant 
heirs, and instituted a nascent philosophical change as to whom the law favoured  – 
the expectant heir could now truly expect the ability to challenge if disinherited 
unduly. As Johnston outlines: 
 Only with the evolution of the  querela inoffi  ciosi testamenti did Roman law arrive 
toward the end of the Republic at the principle that descendants (or ascendants) of a 
testator actually had a legitimate expectation of acquiring a share of his estate, by virtue 
of law rather than the testator ’ s own fancy. 11 
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 Th e reasoning behind  ‘ the evolution ’ of this change in the principle of protec-
tion of expectant heirs remains obscure. Th e most convincing explanation for its 
development is that it was rooted in the idea that a  paterfamilias owed a duty to 
those in his power to provide for them aft er his death, especially to those with 
ties of close kinship. 12 While the  querela off ered improved protection against the 
total arbitrariness of a testator, it was nevertheless far from a complete revision 
of the general principle of the freedom to testate which underpinned Roman 
succession law. 13 
 Th e fi rst, early justifi cation given for hearing a challenge was based on the 
sanity of the testator when the will was made. Th e sources belie the authenticity 
of insanity as the actual cause for action, as the wide scope of what was meant by 
insane is perceptibly disingenuous, as can be seen in the jurist Marcian ’ s defi nition: 
 Th e proposition on which an action for undutious will is raised is that the testators 
were of unsound mind when making the will. And by this is meant not that the testator 
was truly insane or incapacitated but that the will was properly formed but without a 
necessary concern for natural claims; for if he were really insane or incapacitated, the 
will is void. 14 
 A worryingly low bar for insanity, indeed. Yet, as Marcian points out, true insan-
ity would render any will void  ab initio as the testator would be  furiosus . A will is 
considered  iniustum if a testator lacks the capacity,  testamenti factio , when making 
it. 15 A generally insane person, therefore, could make a will, but only if he was 
lucid at the time the will was made; a person who was insane without lucid inter-
vals was lacking in capacity and therefore could not make a valid will. 16 Wills made 
before the onset of insanity remained valid despite a later decline in the mental 
health of the testator. So, given that a will made by a person who was insane at the 
time of making it was void  ab initio , it is clearly outside the boundaries of logic to 
assume that a challenge via the  querela could reasonably be based on an insane 
testator, as there would, in fact, be no legally valid will to challenge at all. Rather, as 
du Plessis argues, the juristic conversation of insanity was a  ‘ pretence as it is clear 
that insanity was not really the issue ’. 17 What, then, was really at issue in a chal-
lenge for an undutiful will ? 
 Th e fundamental criterion which ought to be fulfi lled was that the testator had 
been  ‘ undutiful ’ in the making of his will. Th is terminology is not brimming with 
clarity, yet it seems fair to suppose that the basic scenario is when the testator acts 
in a manner which is unjust towards the claimant. Th e issue, then, is not so much 
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insanity as inequity. Yet, this realisation does little to aid our understanding of the 
exact circumstances in which a claim may be brought, or in what way the court 
of the  centumviri exercised its discretion to allow these cases to be heard with any 
consistency. 
 One of the reasons the juristic sources identify as an underlying cause for 
challenge to a will was a misunderstanding between the testator and the claimant 
resulting in an undutiful disinheritance, as the jurist Marcellus writes: 
 To state that a will is undutious is to argue that one ought not to have been disinherited 
or overlooked. In general, this happens when parents disinherit or overlook their chil-
dren from a misunderstanding. 18 
 Th is falls outside what could be reasonably termed grounds of challenge by insan-
ity, as misunderstandings are not the same as madness on the part of the testator. 
Th e pretence of insanity was a ruse to justify disregarding the testator ’ s right to 
choose his heirs. It was also used as a reason for disregarding the civil law of 
succession. Inequity takes centre stage in considerations of when the  querela could 
be brought, as Gaius tells us: 
 For parents ought not to be unjust to their children in wills. In general, they do this, 
making a poor judgement on their own off spring, when their opinion has been altered 
by the fl atteries or machinations of stepmothers. 19 
 Here, we are given clear evidence that injustice and inequity is at the heart of 
what constitutes an undutiful will. Gaius goes on to provide an example of when 
a misunderstanding between a testator and prospective heir can lead to an unjust 
and undutiful disinheritance: a child passed over by a father as a result of the 
intrigues of a begrudging stepmother. Th is example reveals that, rather than 
insanity of the testator being the reason for the use of the  querela , an intuition of 
injustice is the pivotal factor in the challenge. However, this raises further issues. 
It is still not clear where the limitations of a potential challenge lie; moreover, it 
is even less clear how consistency could be attained where an intuition of injus-
tice underpins a challenge. It is not incredible to envisage a situation in which 
every child feels unjustly cheated by every disinheritance, leading to the use of the 
 querela with overzealous abandon. Restriction existed as to the degree of familial 
separation by which claims could be challenged, alongside other limitations, such 
as a personal bar through acquiescence to other terms in the will. Even so, a claim 
of pure dutifulness still made complaints under the  querela relatively common. 
According to Ulpian: 
 It should be noted that claims against the undutiful are made oft en. It is possible for 
everyone to claim a lack of duty, parents as well as children. Yet one ’ s cognates beyond 
the degree of brother would be better not concerning themselves with needless cost as 
they are not in a position to win. 20 
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 Challenges to the will as set out were reasonably common; those who were not 
suffi  ciently close to the deceased did not frequently press a challenge, however, as 
their degree of separation made them unable to succeed in a claim. As the  querela 
could only be brought by those who would have inherited had the testator died 
intestate, the claims which succeeded were limited to those made by descendants, 
ascendants, brothers and sisters. 21 
 Th e key phrase in Marcian ’ s description of when the  querela was applicable is 
when the will was regarded as being  non ex offi  cio pietatis . 22 Th at is, without regard 
to the  pietas that is required of a particular offi  ce, or relationship. Th e interplay 
between these two concepts is of prime signifi cance in the reason for deciding 
the worthiness of a challenge. First, the relationship between the testator and the 
aggrieved claimant is of central importance to the merit of the claim, insofar as the 
status assigned to the parties  – that is, how the interpersonal relationship is viewed 
institutionally  – is the basis upon which the law itself assigns property transfers in 
the  ius civile . 
 II.  Pietas in Roman Society and Law 
 Th e  Oxford Classical Dictionary defi nes  pietas as,  ‘ the typical Roman attitude of 
dutiful respect towards gods, fatherland, and parents and other kinsmen ’. 23 Wagen-
voort provides a good encapsulation of its general meaning, by outlining that the 
man who possesses  pietas  ‘ performed all his duties towards the deity and his fellow 
human beings fully and in every respect ’. 24 In its broad sense,  pietas was a perva-
sive, philosophical concept, entrenched in the mindset of the Roman and more 
broadly in Roman society. Th e nature of the concept is necessarily hierarchical, 
insofar as it was always a factor in a relative relationship, as Saller points out: 
 First, the emphasis is on duty rather than aff ection or compassion. Secondly, it is a 
virtue displayed primarily toward a high power, whether it be the gods, the fatherland, 
or parents. 25 
 Th is is refl ected in the cultural value attached to it in art and literature, particu-
larly in Virgil. 26 Th ere is also evidence in inscription which stresses the virtue of 
 pietas . 27 Moreover, it is made clear in the reverence shown to it within the law. 
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Th e virtue of  pietas was in turn subdivided into three forms: in regard to parents; 
in regard to fatherland; and concerning divinity. 28  Pietas has a religious under-
tone, rooting itself in a natural order. Its realisation, as Wissowa alludes to, is 
all-encompassing, a complete fulfi lment of what is expected in duty from the indi-
vidual to his surrounding world. Specifi c types of  pietas for other relationships 
were also acknowledged, such as fraternal  pietas . 29 All forms were reliant upon 
the acknowledgement of an institutional status  – that is, upon the realisation that 
the status of individuals in relation to each other changed their interaction at an 
institutional level. Th erefore, the relationship between father and son, for instance, 
takes two forms, the true relationship of everyday life and the institutional relation-
ship of status which is imposed in various social, moral and legal ways. Gardner 
draws the important distinction that  ‘ in real life the Romans lived in families  … 
 familia , being a legal construct ’. 30 Th e  familia is a legal concept subject to insti-
tutional convention and in this way the  pietas between parents and children was 
both real, insofar as it was based on natural affi  nity, but also social, insofar as it was 
enforced by the relationship of social status. Th e duality of  pietas between social 
order and familial aff ection is well accounted for in Dixon ’ s description of  ‘ a strong 
sentimental ideal of family feeling  … overlapped with and supplemented (by) the 
traditional sense of obligation ’. 31 
 Key examples of  pietas are related in Latin literature. Valerius Maximus, who 
is fundamentally concerned with parental  pietas , provides seven examples, under 
the title  de pietate erga parentes et fratres et patriam . 32 Most striking of these is the 
account of a young woman breastfeeding her imprisoned mother to sustain her life. 33 
 Valerius Maximus sets this up as the archetypal example of  pietas , a notion 
evidently held in some consensus, by the fact the Romans raised a temple to  pietas 
at the site where the event took place. Th ree key points can be taken from this anec-
dote. First, we can see clearly that  pietas was not strictly limited to fathers and sons 
but is dependent upon duty towards a kind of relationship, mother and daugh-
ter included. 34 Second, we can see that acknowledgement of duty resulting from 
a hierarchy is essential to its function. Th e daughter exemplifi es  pietas through 
her loving devotion ( deligere ) to her mother, the aff ection born out of devotional 
duty, more so than sentimental aff ection. 35 Th ird, that  obsequium (deference) is 
a signifi cant characteristic of the duty owed as part of  pietas . 36 Th e expression of 
this duty is provided by Valerius Maximus in a series of  exempla which focus on 
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paternal  pietas : Coriolanus ceasing hostilities at his mother ’ s behest; 37 Scipio Afri-
canus being driven by  pietas towards his father ’ s memory to defeat Hannibal; 38 
Lucius Manlius Torquatus ’ s son threatening the tribune Pomponius to persuade 
the offi  cial to drop charges against his horrible father, despite the hardship he had 
endured in his father ’ s power; 39 Marcus Cotta, on taking the  toga virilis , accusing 
his father ’ s prosecutor; 40 the tribune Gaius Flaminus coming down from the  rosta 
at his father ’ s orders out of respect for  auctoritas patria ; 41 and the vestal virgin 
Claudia using her prestige to stop a tribune preventing her father ’ s triumph. 42 
Th ese examples from Valerius Maximus are generally seen in terms of  exempla 
of good moral behaviour, a form which is usually attributed to rhetoric. As Saller 
suggests,  ‘ in Roman society the experts at the invocation of the conventional values 
illustrated by Valerius Maximus were the rhetoricians, for whom  exempla were the 
tools of persuasion ’. 43 Th is is the established practice of rhetoricians in setting out 
moral goods with reference to social norms. Saller, however, takes these examples 
to be essentially fi ctionalised and detached from any purposive reality: 
 Th e rhetoricians ’ manipulation of virtues in debates over imaginary confl icts provides 
insights into the meanings and associations of moral values. Th e fact that these rhetori-
cal exercises are fi ctitious and highly contrived does not diminish their value as evidence 
for the meanings of virtue and the logic of the Roman moral system. 44 
 Certainly, some rhetorical debates were contrived and used explicitly for academic 
purposes but Saller, in my view, underplays the important practical role of rhetori-
cal  exempla , and the very evident fact that Valerius Maximus takes his examples of 
 pietas from reality, not imagination. Th e  exempla provided reveal that  pietas was 
not the construction of a manipulated virtue but, rather, an extant, socially under-
stood value, widely acknowledged within Roman society. 
 Pietas in the modern legal scholarship is confi ned to a simpler and less sophisti-
cated notion of fi lial obedience. Schulz provides a good example of this limitation, 
where he only discusses  pietas in relation to children obeying parents. For Schulz, 
the only legal impact of  pietas was that it imposed a duty towards parental authority 
and therefore  pietatis ratio was simply  obsequium toward parents. 45 In legal prac-
tice, this did not impose or create any obligations but, rather, meant that there was 
an obligation not to abuse parents. Th is is manifest in following what Schulz labels 
 ‘ three legal rules ’ : a child must not summon a parent to court without the permis-
sion of the praetor; a child must not bring  actiones famosae against parents; and a 
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child must not eff ect execution against his parents. 46 Schulz ’ s view places the stress 
of parental relationships on the  auctoritas of the father as a signifi er of the creation 
of certain legal eff ects: that is, the eff ects of coming under the  patria potestas . 47 
Th e focus is very legalistic and does not examine the relationship of parents and 
children in closer detail; it has scant regard to the operation of relationships within 
either the actual family or the legal  familia . In this understanding,  pietas is reduced 
to a broad notion of fi lial obedience, rather than the more nuanced interpretation 
that we derived from Valerius Maximus. 
 Th e narrow view of  pietas as fi lial obedience and of its legal eff ect as a proscrip-
tion on abusing parents is not displayed in the juristic sources. In social terms, 
the central theme of  patria potestas was its characterisation by  pietas . Rather than 
strict adherence to  obsequium as subjection of the child to the whims of the father, 
the  patria potestas of the  paterfamilias was underpinned by an aversion to  atrocitas , 
or the harsh and rigid imposition of authority. 48 It is my view that to understand 
 pietas merely as  obsequium and to confl ate  obsequium with fi lial obligation is to 
misstep. Th is is shown in the literary sources, where, although the duty of  obse-
quium is outlined as a defi ning theme, the aff ection of a real family bond is also 
present in  pietas as a concept. Schulz ’ s narrowing of the concept is not in keeping 
with these sources. Nor is it in keeping with the legal sources; for instance, in the 
Digest, we fi nd the following: 
 It is said that when during a hunt a certain man killed his son, who had been committing 
adultery with his stepmother, the deifi ed Hadrian banished him to an island [because 
he acted] more as a bandit in killing him than as [someone] with a father ’ s right; for 
paternal power should be contingent on compassion, not brutality. 49 
 Here, we are provided with a clear example of the law recognising that  pietas 
constitutes more than the recognition of an obligation to fi lial obedience through 
 obsequium ; it restrains the father from exercising his rights to the letter of the law, 
lest he behave in such a way as to endanger the reciprocal feeling of  pietas that 
ought to exist between father and son. Th is shows that Schulz ’ s narrow interpreta-
tion does not represent the whole understanding of  pietas in the Roman mind; 
 pietas , rather than simply setting out three restrictions on the basis of parental 
deference, can, in fact, require a father not to act in the way ascribed by law to his 
 patria potestas . Th e law in its strictest, literal interpretation is circumvented by an 
appeal to a conceptual idea, which outranks it, an unwritten obligation to behave 
with  pietas which is here legally enshrined by imperial proclamation. Th is section 
is suffi  cient to show the narrowness of the limitation but does not reveal to us the 
means by which the Emperor Hadrian felt it incumbent upon himself to rule as he 
did. For this, other examples of  pietas in the legal sources are illuminating. 
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 Th e jurists were more than happy to modify or circumvent the law in such 
a way as to consider  pietas as a directly and implementable factor in construing 
legal rules. An example is found in the case where relatives provide  alimenta for 
a fatherless child ( pupillus ) out of  pietas . Th is personally bars them from recov-
ery of that cost from the child ’ s estate under the normal rules of unauthorised 
administration: 
 I replied that, if Titus supported his sister ’ s daughter from a sense of duty [ pietatis ], he 
did not have an action against her on this account. 50 
 We can clearly see that  pietas is noted as directly aff ecting juristic argument. 
Nevertheless, we are left  without much of an explanation as to what Modes-
tinus meant when he employed the term. What can be seen, however, is that 
Schulz ’ s limited view that  pietas in legal terms is synonymous with fi lial obedi-
ence through  obsequium is insuffi  cient. Th e circumvention of the usual rules of 
unauthorised administration is not achieved by reference to the kind of relation-
ships Schulz discusses but appears to be based on an appeal to the kind of  pietas 
seen in Valerius Maximus. Indeed, supporting a sister ’ s daughter out of pious 
duty is more akin to the actions described in Valerius Maximus 5.6.7 than it is 
to the prescriptive obligations outlined by Schulz. Th is is not an isolated exam-
ple. Other passages from the Digest show the jurists circumventing standard 
legal rules by reference to the kind of broader  ‘ social ’  pietas of the  exempla in 
Pliny and Valerius Maximus, rather than to Schulz ’ s narrower  ‘ legal ’  pietas . For 
instance, the general rules of law applied to dowry can again be disregarded in 
favour of an appeal to  pietas : 
 If a woman labours under the notion that she is required to give a dowry, she cannot 
recuperate anything given on that account; for underneath there remains the moral 
bond [ pietatis ], and a payment based on that reason cannot be recuperated. 51 
 Again, this is not obviously limited to fi lial obedience. In fact, it has little to do with 
 obsequium to parents. Th e stress here is on the fulfi lment of the moral obligation 
arising out of a relationship, in this case, with her husband. I would suggest that 
this is more akin to the  pietas of Valerius Maximus than it is to pure deference to 
authority. Th e  pietas of the  exempla circumvents or modifi es the law, and fi ts no 
narrow legalistic interpretation of the term. 
 Further examples abound, where  pietas is central to modifying the rules on 
untrustworthy tutors and curators: 
 Furthermore, even women are admitted, but only those who take this step under the 
compulsion of duty [ pietate ] and necessity, as for example, a mother. A nurse also and 
a grandmother can bring a charge. So can a sister; for in a case of a sister, there even 
exists a rescript of the deifi ed Severus; and if there is any other woman whose deliberate 
sense of duty [ pietatem ] is perceived by the praetor although she does not go beyond 
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the modesty of her sex, but was induced by her sense of duty [ pietate ] not to conceal the 
wrong beyond the  pupilli , the praetor should allow her to make an accusation. 52 
 Once more, the  pietas in question here is not simple fi lial deference but depends, 
rather, on an appreciation of the broader notion. It is analogous to several of the 
examples provided in Valerius Maximus. Once more, the jurists commit to modi-
fi cation of the law based on arguments rooted in the broad  ‘ social ’ understanding 
of  pietas , and not a limited  ‘ legalistic ’ one. A similar example makes the point clear: 
 But moreover, when it is a mother who appeals concerning the property of her son 
being ruined by a judgment, she should be granted a hearing out of reverence to family 
piety, and if she prefers to take on the preparation of the lawsuit, she is not regarded as 
bringing a disruptive action, even if initially she cannot defend the case. 53 
 Th e concession made by law to  pietas has ostensibly no link to authority here 
but, rather, to a mutual relationship of aff ection and duty. Th is mutuality is a 
symmetrical appreciation of the role of duty regarding  pietas but it is not truly 
synallagmatic: there is no obligatory reciprocity but a unilateral moral obligation 
which is mirrored but non-dependent on particular action. Nor is there a deter-
mined obligation in the form of a legal imposition of particular action, as we see 
from our example. A mother can, and indeed  ought , to protect her son ’ s property 
by raising an action, based on the social practice of  pietas . Th e interesting thing for 
present purposes is that the law gives way to this social demand, and the civil law 
is modifi ed in favour of this social  – not legal  – reasoning. 
 One more example shows this social understanding of  pietas being used 
directly to modify law: 
 But if the freedman has given his daughter a dowry, he does not appear to have defrauded 
his patron in respect of the amount of the dowry, because a father ’ s duty [ pietas ] is not 
to be the cause of condemnation. 54 
 Justinian ’ s Institutes recall that the origin of Roman law may lie outwith written 
statement. 55 Contained within the very fabric of the law is an appreciation of the 
unwritten nature of determinative socially understood values as important sources 
of law. Th e silence of the text on the nature of these unwritten laws goes beyond a 
mere tradition of customary acceptance of particular modes of behaviour, extending 
to the cultural appreciation of the underlying values which cause that behaviour. It 
is in this way that  pietas , as a socially understood value, operates as the basis for law. 
 We fi nd further discussion of  pietas in the  Rhetorica ad Herennium . Here the 
Auctor brings up  pietas in his discussion of the division ( partes ) of law ( ius ). Of the six 
divisions of law  – nature, statute, custom, precedent, equity and agreement 56  – which 
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the Auctor sets out, he provides a specifi c example of each, except for nature, where 
he raises  pietas . 57 Th e provision given by the Auctor of natural law is the bond of 
children and parents: 
 Natural law is seen in the relationships formed from the reason of  pietas ; it is by this law 
that parents are nurtured by children and children by parents. 58 
 Pietas is presented to us by the Auctor as a principle which is directly related to 
natural law, not only as a result of natural law but rather as an integral part of it, as 
a concept which is inherent to natural law. Th e ascription of  pietas to natural law is 
made with little explanation, other than a simple assertion that it is an observable 
inference. Th e sentiment replicates that of Valerius Maximus in his assessment of 
the virtue of  pietas . Th e diffi  culty here lies in our understanding of law, because the 
nurturing of children is not law in the same sense as property rights or delictual 
liability. Natural law provides an overarching superstructure to which man-made 
law is oft en referential and to which it is sometimes inextricably bound. Th at said, 
natural law is not enforceable in the same direct sense as man-made law. Th erefore, 
its enforceability takes the form of social normativity and not legal obligation. Ill-
treatment of children by parents then  – the failure to nourish  – is a social and moral 
breach, rather than a legal one, in terms of how society enforces its standards. 
 Honor é ’ s distinction between appeals to particular types of argument put forward 
by the Romans in providing reasons for decision-making is of use here in formulating 
this thought, between what he calls  ‘ appeals to rules of law ’,  ‘ open arguments ’ ( topoi or 
principles),  ‘ the facts ’, and  ‘ argumenta ex auctoritate ’ (specifi cally juristic authority). 59 
In the instance where  pietas governs the relationship between parents and children, 
in order to give not only a social – moral but also a legal dimension to that relationship 
based on natural law, the argument is principled or open, it concerns a  topos . Winkel 
argues that the lack of a coherent hierarchy of sources was the cause of the need for 
open, topical arguments in decision-making. 60 Winkel ’ s classifi cation is correct, inso-
far as the diversity of rationality for decision-making is less well defi ned than it is in 
modern civilian legal systems. However, although it engages a broad interpretation 
in decision-making, it does not provide us with an answer as to how open reasoning 
behind decisions in a case exists within a system which purportedly had developed a 
nascent scientifi c tendency. What is of more interest in the example with which we are 
presented here is how the open-argumentation (that is, topical rhetoric) is a corner-
stone of legal argumentation, necessary for the creation of legal obligations. 
 In  De oratore , Cicero, in the voice of his interlocutor Crassus, acknowledges 
the needs of the orator to make pronouncements on a variety of subjects. 61 Among 
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these topics with which the orator must deal is  pietas . 62 Cicero points out that the 
orator ’ s dabbling in more specialised topics results in some disgruntlement among 
the specialists: 
 All the academies and schools of philosophy will, I do believe, raise the cry that all these 
matters are their exclusive province, and in no way whatever the concern of the orator. 63 
 On issues of philosophy and law, the technical specialisation of these topics makes 
knowledge of the subject an essential for informed speech. Apart from these 
more discrete topics, Cicero also includes friendship, harmony, equity and virtue. 
Th ese subjects are less obviously accounted for than law and philosophy, which 
have easily understood parameters. Th e answer to their inclusion comes from the 
contention  – made by Crassus later in the same interaction with Scaevola  – that the 
expertise of the orator lies in the broader theme of  ‘ human life and conduct ’. 64 Th is 
statement  – that the true province of the orator lies in human life and conduct  – is 
revealing; and it is contested, in its fundamental terms, by neither Scaevola nor 
Antonius in Cicero ’ s text. Th e implication is that the orator  – through the technical 
process by which he acquires his argument, rhetoric  – is properly to be under-
stood fi rst and foremost as an expert in human social interaction: human life and 
conduct. Th e orator, therefore, in making his pleadings, has a particular social 
expertise, from which he can draw the  loci of his arguments. 
 Turning to the issue of the  loci of arguments for the conclusion of equitable 
remedies, Cicero, in his  Topica , points out the need to distinguish three types of 
speech in constructing an argument from particular places. Judicial speeches, 
which appeal to equity, concern diff erent rhetorical origins from deliberative or 
encomiastic speeches, which deal in advantage and honour. Cicero explains the 
 locus for arguments in judicial speeches. 65 He argues that each of these three forms 
of argumentation has, through the practice and theory of oratory and rhetoric, 
developed stylistic diff erences. In judicial argumentation ( iuridicalis ), the purpose 
of equitable remedy is to distinguish right from wrong. 
 Th e actual application of this kind of argumentation is outlined in the case of 
the will of a soldier in  De oratore . At fi rst impression, it appears that the decision 
here is made on legal grounds, specifi cally on a question of the civil law: does a son 
have a right to a legitimate share of his father ’ s estate by virtue of being a son not 
explicitly named as disinherited ? However, in reality, Cicero attributes the award 
of the estate to the rhetorical arguments of  pietas used by Lucius Licinius Cras-
sus in the course of the argument. 66 Cicero ’ s attribution reveals how the socially 
understood value of  pietas has an actual application in legal decision-making. 
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 III. Later Evidence for the Application of  Pietas in the 
 Querela Inoffi  ciosi Testamenti 
 It is right to say that, apart from the attestation of Valerius Maximus, the Auctor of the 
 Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero, there is little evidence for the actual application 
of  pietas as the ratio decidendi for decisions made in challenges under  querela during 
the later Republican period. Nonetheless, we can be sure that it was applied as a key 
factor in the decision-making process. Th e jurists, as outlined, give verifi cation of this 
fact. However, our source material is dishearteningly limited in providing us with an 
insight as to the exact mechanisms by which the  querela was dependent on  pietas as the 
decisive factor by which the  centumviri were persuaded. Furthermore, the justifi cation 
for the reasoning behind  pietas overriding the civil law as a basis for decision-making 
remains shrouded in uncertainty. Th is uncertainty is behind the rise of the prevailing 
idea that a separation occurred between the law as set out by jurists in the fi rst phase 
of a challenge, and an extra-legal second phase which began in pleadings before the 
centumviral court, where rhetoric was applied with little relation to the preceding legal 
phase. Despite this lack of sources from the late Republic, legal literature from later 
periods provides us with a discernible insight as to how  pietas operated in relation to 
law in challenges for undutiful wills. In particular, the  Codex Iustinianus provides a 
series of imperial rescripts which, though written at a much later period than that of 
the inception of the  querela  – and, as such, subject to the social and legal diff erences 
which the intervening centuries imply  – mention claims of undutiful wills in their 
historical context, either directly, or as an analogous legal form through which other 
issues could be solved. Th ese texts are useful, though it must be stressed imperfect, in 
providing us with evidence of the actual, practical relationship between law and rheto-
ric in the centumviral court in the period of the later Republic. 
 Before undertaking this examination, some consideration must be given 
to the substantive changes in succession law which occurred in the intervening 
time, which have a direct impact on the cases presented. First, obvious institu-
tional changes separate the Republic from the Empire: the introduction of specifi c 
legal instruments with regard to succession law must be borne in mind to prop-
erly contextualise the law according to period. Second is the  senatus consultum 
Orphitianum of 178  ce , during the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Th is made provi-
sion for children to make fi rst claim on their mother ’ s estate as  legitimi under 
the praetorian rules of succession. Th is prevented fathers from limiting eman-
cipated daughters from making wills through guardianship and also aff orded 
children the same priority in inheritance from mothers ’ wills as they were due 
under fathers ’ wills, changing the dimension of the order of succession. 67 Th ird, 
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the edictal category of  unde liberi was not conclusively in existence by the 50s  bce 
and therefore is of dubious application in regard to development of the  querela in 
the mid-fi rst century  bce . 68 Th ese changes to the law caused divergence in terms 
of substantive legal points but did not undermine the general integrity of the form 
of challenge for undutiful wills. 
 Th e fi rst of the related rescripts found in the  Codex Iustinianus is given by the 
Emperor Philip the Arab to a certain Nicanor and Papiniana, and deals directly 
with the  querela , dating from 245  ce . Th e case concerns a mother off ering gift s 
to strangers and certain children in order to deprive other children of their legal 
portion: 
 If, as you allege, your mother, in order to frustrate a complaint seeking to have her will 
set aside as undutiful, during her lifetime almost exhausted all her property by making 
gift s either to certain of her children or to strangers, and aft erwards made you heirs to 
two-twelft hs of her property and wanted to reduce that to nothing through legacies 
and testamentary requests, you do not unjustly desire to be aided by the provisions of 
the constitutions made concerning undutiful wills, as not having received your legal 
portion. 69 
 Th e text provides us with a clear case of a challenge based on a mother neglecting 
her supposed duty to make provision in her will for her children. As the text dates 
from aft er 178  ce , the  senatus consultum Orphitianum applies. Given that there is 
a use of legacies and testamentary requests (ie,  fi deicomissa ) to delimit what was 
actually inherited to below a quarter of the estate, an immediate issue arises, as this 
is a reduction to below the value which ought to be apportioned to heirs under 
the  lex Falcidia of 40  bce . A quarter of the estate is recoverable for apportionment 
between named heirs on this ground alone, and combats legacy provisions which 
reduce the inheritance to nothing. 70 However, the deliberate exhaustion of the 
estate through a series of gift s given to strangers and other children still frustrates 
the claimants from attaining an equitable amount in the will. Phillip the Arab, 
on noting this, points out that a remedy can be sought for the mother ’ s cynical 
attempt to manipulate her property away from Nicanor and Papiniana, and can be 
redressed by a challenge under the  querela . Th e challenge for an undutiful will is 
due, as such a claim would not be unjust in relation to the constitutions regarding 
the assignment of the legal portion. Th e text provides us with clear evidence that 
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the  querela had survived in a discernible form to the third century  ce . Moreover, it 
reveals that it is applied in scenarios where an injustice has occurred, due to non-
receipt of the prescribed legal portion. Other than that, this injustice presents us 
with a viable challenge; the text does not go further to reveal the bases on which 
an action would be successful. Nevertheless, the text frames the use of the  querela 
in a similar vein to earlier juristic texts, and allows us to understand with confi -
dence that claims for undutiful wills were made in circumstances similar to those 
set out by the classical jurists. Th e question in law here is whether the exhaustion 
of the property by the mother was done to frustrate a duty to provide for the legal 
portion to the claimant children. If the dispersal of gift s was designed to do this, 
the fact that the claim is made under provisions for undutious wills is indicative 
of the existence of a relationship of duty between mother and children beyond 
the provision for the remaining  hereditas under the quarter apportionment rule 
of the  lex Falcidia . Th e inference is that some portion of the gift s  mortis causa can 
be recovered under a challenge of an undutiful will by aggrieved child heirs. Th e 
implication is that the duty by which that inheritance is owed is more akin to  pietas 
than it is to the kind of apportionment set out in positive law. An examination of 
other rescripts sheds further light on this. 
 Th e rescript of Emperors Valerian and Gallien to Aetia from 256  ce is of great 
interest in establishing the operation of the  querela by reference to rhetorical 
conceptions and arguments. Th e scenario is typical of a claim for undutiful will: 
a daughter, Aetia, does not receive the allotted quarter portion as a child on the 
death of her father, due to the  ‘ extravagant generosity ’ with which the father gave 
all his property to his son prior to his death. Th e decision is dependent on whether 
the son was emancipated or not, and the emperors ’ rescript makes provision for 
both circumstances: 
 If your father, by some whim of excessive kindness, gave all his belongings to his son, 
the latter either stayed in the power of his father, in which case, in an action to divide, 
it suits the judge to split the property in such a way that you entirely inherit the quar-
ter of the share due on intestacy; or the son is emancipated, in which case, since a gift  
requires no outside assistance but is supported by its own strength, that is, no confi rma-
tion is required, the governor will, according to the constitutions, extend equitable relief 
following the pattern of a complaint to set a will aside as undutiful. 71 
 Th e fi rst permutation refers to the apportionment of wills under the  lex Falcidia . 
Where the son  – presumably Aetia ’ s brother  – to whom Aetia ’ s father so generously 
granted all of his property so extravagantly, is not emancipated but still in the 
power of his father, Aetia ought to receive the legal portion which is legally owed to 
her: that is, the quarter share which would be due on intestacy. Th e remedy attested 
to here is well attested. It shares a factual and legal theme with the rescript of Philip 
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the Arab to Nicanor and Papiniana. Where a legal portion of an inheritance has 
been taken away from a child in order to benefi t another child, the law off ers the 
 querela as a standard remedy for the recovery of the legal portion. Th e reasoning 
behind the exercise of a challenge of undutiful will goes no further than allowing 
a remedy for a recovery of an amount that ought to be inherited by prescription 
of positive law. Th e more signifi cant scenario is that outlined in the case where the 
son is emancipated and beyond the scope of  patria potestas . 
 In the second situation presented in the rescript, consideration is given to 
Aetia ’ s position where the son to whom her father gave so generously is emanci-
pated. Th e son ’ s emancipation changes the complexion of the problem. If the son 
is emancipated, the gift  remains legally valid. No direct legal remedy is off ered 
to Aetia, and the gift  of the father to his son stands in law. However, the imperial 
rescript does not leave Aetia without redress. Rather, we are told that the provin-
cial magistrate is able to hear a challenge to assignment of the property. Although 
the gift  is able to stand on its own strength ( suis viribus ), the constitutions ( iuxta 
constitutiones ) made provision for equitable relief to be sought by analogy to the 
 querela ( ad similitudinem inoffi  ciosi querellae auxilium tibi aequitas impertiet ). Th is 
is interesting for two reasons: fi rst, despite a valid gift  existing in law, the emperor 
is still willing to attempt to fi nd Aetia a remedy on the grounds of equity ( aequitas ) 
through the constitutions; second, the argument is made by analogy to the q uerela , 
indicating that the decision reached upon equitable grounds against a legally valid 
gift  in order to redress an unfairness in inheritance law shares the conceptual and 
mechanistic qualities of the  querela itself. 
 Th e fact that the emperor felt comfortable making an analogy to the  querela 
inoffi  ciosi testamenti in this instance is not an isolated case. Later examples show 
that actions against  ‘ undutious gift s ’ were introduced to the law by analogy to the 
 querela . Th e interesting feature is the means by which the emperor frames the 
resolution of the issue: by following the solution provided by equitable remedy in 
extension from cases of challenges for undutious wills. 
 On what basis is the challenge made ? We see that, by this stage, the pretence 
of insanity as the ground for a claim has long since evaporated. Aetia ’ s case is clear 
that the father ’ s motivation for favouring gift s is extravagant generosity ( immensae 
liberalitatis ), which, though unwise, is not insane. Accordingly, the development of 
a claim analogous to the  querela need not dwell on the sanity of the testator  – nor, 
in fact, did the challenge of undutiful will itself. Th e solution provided is born out 
of a feeling of equitability. Th is might seem a vague and insuffi  cient method for 
solving the problem presented, were it not for the fact that, as we have seen,  aequi-
tas was a defi nable and understood concept in Roman society. Th is was the same 
for  pietas . Rather than an appeal to woolly and esoteric ideals, these terms had 
social and legal meaning. Both of them relate to Aetia ’ s case and to the decision of 
the emperors to allow a challenge to the apportionment of her father ’ s estate based 
on the constitutions, despite the legal validity of the will at civil law. 
 We have seen that  pietas forms the foundation for a claim under the  querela . 
Aside from the requirements of status which entitle a claimant,  pietas is the concept 
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which asserts itself as the principal consideration in the  ratio decidendi .  Pietas is 
itself dependent on status and relationship. Th e form of  pietas erga parentes is 
the defi nitive factor in establishing a moral and social duty, which, though not 
symmetrical, nevertheless creates reciprocal social and moral duties upon parents 
and children. Th e challenge to undutiful wills is the transformation of moral and 
social duty into legal obligation. Th at transformation is provided through the 
enforcement of the challenge in the centumviral court. Th at  pietas and  aequitas 
are used as tools of legal reasoning is also a transformation. Th ese ideas change 
from moral and social virtues to legal concepts. Legal concepts can authoritatively 
decide legal remedies, and here we fi nd that Aetia is provided with a challenge 
based on the legal authority of  pietas and  aequitas , as is done in a challenge for 
undutiful will, to provide her with legal redress. 
 A further example is provided in a rescript of the Emperors Diocletian and 
Maximian to a certain Calpurnia Aristaeneta, who sought a remedy for a prodi-
gal son lavishing gift s unreasonably to the detriment of the familial property. Yet 
again, the redress is provided by analogy to a claim for undutiful will: 
 If your son used up his property through profl igate and wasteful generosity, you may 
seek aid from the governor; and if on examination of the root of truth he judges that 
you, through your son, should have restitution of your rights as to the excessively large 
gift s, he will help you by rescinding the wrongful acts. Hence, for the purpose of setting 
the excessive gift s aside, you need no action similar to that of setting a will aside as 
undutiful. 72 
 Th e extension of the criteria of a claim for undutiful will to a claim for undutiful 
gift s is telling, on two points. First, it indicated that the emperor, in making these 
rescripts, was not averse to the application of analogy in legal reasoning. Th is, in 
itself, reveals the scope for rhetorical fi gures in the expansion of legal concepts, as 
dutiful gift s are viewed,  ex similitudine , to share a fundamental essence with undu-
tiful wills. Th e logic was that property divested unreasonably, whether  inter vivos , 
or on death through testament, is challengeable on the grounds that it breaches a 
duty. Th e establishment of that duty, we can infer, is through the maternal rela-
tionship shared between Calpurnia Aristaeneta and her profl igate son, the duty of 
 pietas erga parentes . Second, based on this fi rst inference, we can state with reason-
able confi dence that the reasoning which underpins a claim for undutiful wills is 
the same as that used for undutious gift s. Th e importance of this observation is 
that we can directly see the law expanding, purely on the basis of rhetorical reason-
ing: wills are challengeable when a duty of  pietas is breached; undutiful wills are 
analogous to undutiful gift s, insofar as they both amount to the transfer of family 
property unreasonably against a duty of  pietas to a relative; on the basis of this 
analogy, the remedy for the two ought to be the same. On the basis of this argu-
ment, therefore, a remedy similar to the  querela inoffi  ciosi testamenti is provided for 
undutiful gift s. Th is demonstrates not only that rhetoric provided the underlying 
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ratio decidendi for decisions on undutiful gift s, insofar as it followed the pattern of 
undutiful wills in using breaches of  pietas erga parentes as the defi nitional breach 
in allowing for a challenge, but also that rhetorical reasoning, through the use of 
analogy, was central to legal development, in expanding the scope of the remedy 
from challenges to wills to challenges to donations  inter vivos . 
 Th e rescript to Calpurnia Aristaeneta is not an isolated case. Further rescripts 
follow a similar theme, addressing undutiful gift s by analogy to the remedy for 
undutiful wills. Examples of these are readily available: Cottabaeus was informed 
by Diocletian and Maximian that gift s given to emancipated sons which were 
 ‘ extravagant and generous ’ are recoverable by children seeking  ‘ the amount legally 
due to them ’ by analogy to the  querela ; 73 the same emperors informed a certain 
Demetriana that she was entitled to recover for extravagant gift s made to her 
brother by her father  ‘ following the pattern of a complaint for setting undutiful 
wills aside ’ ; 74 Ammianus was told by the same  Augusti that, if his mother  ‘ dissi-
pated her property and bled her resources dry through extravagant generosity ’ 
to his younger brother, such gift s could be set aside following the logic  ‘ from a 
complaint to set a will aside as undutiful ’ ; 75 the Emperor Constantius wrote to a 
certain Olybrius that 
 there is no doubt that the action concerning immoderate gift s has been introduced into 
the laws following the pattern of laws regarding undutiful wills, and in this respect both 
actions must be deemed as one or similar, both as to time and conditions. 76 
 Th e use of a version of the challenge to undutiful gift s formulated on the basis of 
the challenge to undutiful wills is well established. Th e same logic is also extended, 
though with less evidence, to claims for undutiful dowry gift s,  de inoffi  ciosis 
dotibus . 77 
 Th e reasoning which underpins these points is consistent with that used in 
the decision in the case of Calpurnia Aristaeneta. Th e fundamental points are as 
follows: fi rst, undutiful gift s are analogous to undutiful wills and therefore the same 
remedy following the same criteria is a reasonable resolution to claims; second, the 
reason that these claims are analogous is that they fundamentally invoke  pietas as 
the ratio decidendi. 
 IV. Concluding Remarks 
 Th e idea of a scientifi c revolution in the later Republic has infl uenced scholarly 
interaction with Roman law to the present day. However, during the period in 
98 Graeme Cunningham
which Roman law is thought to have attained scientifi c qualities, legal decision-
makers relied on social, cultural and economic concepts to inform their 
judgments, rather than isolating themselves in a gapless system of law. In show-
ing the impact of  pietas on the development of the  querela inoffi  ciosi testamenti , 
I hope to have presented a nascent challenge to the narrative of Roman legal 
science, and widened the scope of enquiry to consider law within the society in 
which it functions. 
 
